Protective Interface Specifications by Leavens, Gary T. & Wing, Jeannette M.
Computer Science Technical Reports Computer Science
9-1997
Protective Interface Specifications
Gary T. Leavens
Iowa State University
Jeannette M. Wing
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports
Part of the Systems Architecture Commons, and the Theory and Algorithms Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leavens, Gary T. and Wing, Jeannette M., "Protective Interface Specifications" (1997). Computer Science Technical Reports. 120.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports/120
Protective Interface Specifications
Abstract
The interface specification of a procedure describes the procedure's behavior using pre- and postconditions.
These pre- and postconditions are written using various functions. If some of these functions are partial, or
underspecified, then the procedure specification may not be well-defined. We show how to write pre- and
postcondition specifications that avoid such problems, by having the precondition ``protect'' the
postcondition from the effects of partiality and underspecification. We formalize the notion of protection
from partiality in the context of specification languages like VDM-SL and COLD-K. We also formalize the
notion of protection from underspecification for the Larch family of specification languages, and for Larch
show how one can prove that a procedure specification is protected from the effects of underspecification. An
earlier version of this paper, without the appendix sections, appeared in Michel Bidoit and Max Dauchet
(editors), TAPSOFT '97: Theory and Practice of Software Development, 7th International Joint Conference
CAAP/FASE, Lille, France. Volume 1214 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1997,
pages 520-534.
Keywords
Protective specifications, Specification languages, Underspecification, Partiality, Larch
Disciplines
Computer Sciences | Systems Architecture | Theory and Algorithms
Comments
Copyright © 1997 by Springer-Verlag
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports/120
Protective Interface Specications
Gary T. Leavens and Jeannette M. Wing
TR #96-04d
April 1996, Revised October, December 1996, February, September 1997
Keywords: Protective specications; Specication languages; Underspecica-
tion; Partiality; Larch.
1996 CR Categories: D.2.1 [Software Engineering ] Requirements/Specications
| languages, theory, Larch, VDM, Z, RESOLVE; D.2.7 [Software Engineering ] Dis-
tribution and Maintenance | documentation; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Pro-
grams] Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs | assertions, logics
of programs, pre- and post-conditions, specication techniques, theory, LSL
Submitted for publication.
An earlier version of this paper, without the appendix sections, appeared in Michel
Bidoit and Max Dauchet (editors), TAPSOFT '97: Theory and Practice of Software
Development, 7th International Joint Conference CAAP/FASE, Lille, France. Vol-
ume 1214 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pages 520{
534.
An earlier version of this paper was called \Protection from the Underspecied".
This technical report is also CMU-CS-96-129R.
Copyright
c
 1997 by Springer-Verlag.
Department of Computer Science
226 Atanaso Hall
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011-1040, USA
Protective Interface Specications
Gary T. Leavens
1
and Jeannette M. Wing
y2
September 15, 1997
1
Department of Computer Science, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011 USA
2
Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
Abstract
The interface specication of a procedure describes the procedure's behavior
using pre- and postconditions. These pre- and postconditions are written using
various functions. If some of these functions are partial, or underspecied, then
the procedure specication may not be well-dened.
We show how to write pre- and postcondition specications that avoid such
problems, by having the precondition \protect" the postcondition from the
eects of partiality and underspecication. We formalize the notion of pro-
tection from partiality in the context of specication languages like VDM-SL
and COLD-K. We also formalize the notion of protection from underspecica-
tion for the Larch family of specication languages, and for Larch show how
one can prove that a procedure specication is protected from the eects of
underspecication.
1 The Problem
This paper seeks to explain and precisely dene properties of \good" procedure spec-
ications. These properties say when the precondition of a procedure specication
protects the postcondition from partiality or underspecication in the vocabulary
used in the specication. While we will precisely dene protection for formal speci-
cations, it can be applied and used in even informal specications (with, of course,
less precision).
To explain what a protective specication is, we start with an informal example.
Consider an (ill-dened) specication of an integer-valued factorial procedure, such as
that found in Figure 1. This behavioral interface specication is to be implemented
in C++, which explains why C++ syntax is used to specify how it is to be called.

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2int factorial(int x);
behavior {
requires informally "x is not too big";
ensures informally "result is the factorial of x";
}
Figure 1: An ill-dened informal specication of a factorial procedure.
int factorial(int x);
behavior {
requires informally "x is nonnegative and x is not too big";
ensures informally "result is the factorial of x";
}
Figure 2: A protective informal specication of a factorial procedure.
The pre- and postconditions follow requires and ensures, respectively; when the
precondition is satised, the procedure must terminate in a state that satises the
postcondition. (The keyword informally in Larch/C++ [22] signals the start of an
informal predicate.) This specication is ill-dened, because it is not clear what the
procedure should return when x is negative. The problem is that mathematics does
not dene what \the factorial of x" means when x is negative, but for that case the
specication seems to require a correct implementation to return some integer. Note
that the problem with this specication has nothing at all to do with the particu-
lar mathematical formalism used to write the pre- and postconditions, or with any
particular logic for reasoning about what they mean.
A better, yet still informal, specication of the factorial procedure is given in
Figure 2. In this specication the precondition requires that the argument x is non-
negative, and thus has a well-dened factorial. We say that the precondition of
Figure 2 \protects" the postcondition, because for all values of the arguments that
satisfy the precondition, the vocabulary used in the post-condition is well-dened.
Thus whatever the phrase \the factorial of x" might mean when x is negative does
not matter.
The concept of protection, even in informal specications, does have one subtle
twist. It is that one part of a precondition may protect other parts of the precondition
itself, so that the entire precondition is well-dened. Most programmers are familiar
with examples where they must check that a number is nonzero before checking
some condition involving a ratio or modulo calculation. The same idea applies in
specications such as the one in Figure 3, where the rst conjunct in the precondition
(\denom is positive") protects the second. That is, if the rst conjunct is false,
the entire precondition is false, and so the meaning of the second conjunct does
not matter, as the implementation will not have any specied behavior in such a
case. (Note that the postcondition is also protected by the rst conjunct in the
precondition.)
In the example of Figure 3, the (informal) logic used to reason about the meaning
3double taxFor(int base, int num, int denom);
behavior {
requires informally "denom is positive and 0  (num/denom)  1";
ensures informally "result is approximately (num/denom) * base";
}
Figure 3: A protective specication that demonstrates protection within the precon-
dition.
of the precondition matters. In our informal argument we assumed that if the rst
conjunct in the precondition is false, then the entire precondition is false (and hence
well-dened). However, since the precondition is informal, one could plausibly argue
that since the \/" operator used in the second conjunct is partial, it has no meaning
when \denom" is zero, and in that case perhaps the entire precondition should be
considered meaningless. To resolve such questions, one must take the rst step to-
wards a formal specication language, and agree on some conventions for interpreting
such formulas.
In this paper we consider what protection means with respect to partiality and
underspecication. Our treatment of protection is not meant to be exhaustive, but
merely to illustrate concepts that are useful with some logics that are widely used for
formal specication. (See [8, 14] for surveys that also cover additional kinds of logics
that might be used in formal specication, and hence might need their own concepts
of protection. Also PVS [25] represents another kind of specication logic that should
be considered in extending our concepts.)
The rst concept of protection we discuss is appropriate for behavioral interface
specication languages (BISLs) that use a logic that accepts the existence of partial
functions and has various non-classical ways to reason about them. For example,
VDM-SL [19, 1] uses a logic called LPF [19, Section 3.3] [2, 3, 20], which has three
logical values and two kinds of equality.
1
As another example, the specication lan-
guage COLD-K [10] uses a logic having just two logical values, but in which all other
types have an improper value, ?, which models the \undened" results of partial
functions, and also models computations that go into innite loops or cause errors.
All other values are proper. In COLD-K there is also a denedness predicate, D, that
allows one to reason explicitly about whether a term denotes a proper value or not.
There are several other languages with similar concepts [4, 6, 27, 21, 29].
The second concept of protection we discuss is appropriate for BISLs that use a
logic that does not admit the existence of partial functions, but uses underspecica-
tion. In such a logic, one avoids specifying a value for undened terms [14, 18]. In this
approach, to make a term \undened" one simply does not specify its value; hence it
will not be possible to prove anything about such a term. This kind of logic is used
in the Larch Shared Language, LSL [15, Chapter 4] [16], which is the mathematical
component of the Larch family BISLs [15], in the BISLs of the RESOLVE family [24],
1
However, in LPF nonstrict (i.e., strong) equality and the denedness operator, , are only used
in meta-arguments, since the logic is designed so that one only needs to use strict (i.e., weak) equality
in proofs.
4and in Z [17, 26] (according to its draft standard [30]). The subtle problems that
underspecication may cause for the unwary in LSL (and similar logics) are discussed
in Appendix A; indeed Jones's paper pointing out these problems [18] motivated the
present work.
It is not the purpose of this paper to advocate one kind of logic over another. In-
stead, this paper explores concepts of protection, with the aim of improving intuition
about it and providing more guidance to speciers. We also discuss how to prove
protection from the eects of underspecication.
2 Protective Procedure Specications
The idea of protection in a BISL was rst formulated by Wing [28, Section 5.1.4].
Although we generalize that notion here, our goal is the same as Wing's original:
knowing when a behavioral interface specication protects \its users from the incom-
pleteness of the" mathematical vocabulary used in that specication \by ensuring that
the meaning of the procedure specication is independent of any incompleteness" in
that vocabulary (p. 123).
2.1 Partiality Protection
In a specication language like VDM-SL or COLD-K, and TROLL light [13], the no-
tion of a procedure specication that protects against partiality is relatively straight-
forward. This is because the associated logic explicitly includes a \bottom" element,
?, and a denedness predicate, which we will write as D (where D(?) = false and if x
is proper then D(x) = true). The symbol ` stands for provability in the appropriate
logic (for LPF, at the metalogical level). The idea is that a specication is protective
if for all possible inputs, the precondition is dened, and whenever the precondition
is true, then the postcondition is dened.
Denition 2.1 (partiality-protective) A procedure specication, S, that uses a
mathematical theory, T , and has formal parameters, ~x :
~
U , precondition, Q(~x), and
postcondition, R(~x), is partiality-protective if and only if
 T ` 8~x :
~
U : D(Q(~x)), and
 T ` 8~x :
~
U : Q(~x)) D(R(~x)).
For example, the VDM-SL specication of factorial in Figure 4 is partiality-
protective, because the precondition is always dened, and whenever x satises the
precondition, the postcondition is always dened.
2.2 Underspecication Protection
The Larch family, the RESOLVE family, and Z use logics in which all functions are
total. Since we are most familiar with Larch, we concentrate on Larch in the discussion
below. The appropriate notions for RESOLVE and Z can be dened similarly. For
5fact: int -> int
fact(i) == if i = 0 then 1 else i * fact(i-1)
FACTORIAL(x: int) result: int
pre 0 <= x and x <= 8
post result = fact(x)
Figure 4: An auxiliary function specication and a protective procedure specication
for factorial in VDM-SL. (Note that the factorial of 9 is larger than 2
16
.)
bufferTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
bufSize: ! Int
asserts
equations
0 < bufSize ^ bufSize  1024;
Figure 5: A trait with an underspecied constant.
a logic that regards all functions as total, the notion of partiality protection has
no meaning. The analogous notion, which we call \underspec-protection," is a test
that the meaning of a procedure specication does not rely on underspecied terms.
Note, however, that an operator may be underspecied for reasons other than being
\partial." For example, in Figure 5, bufSize is underspecied but not partial in any
sense.
2
We dene the notion of underspec-protection in three steps. First we dene the
notion of a primed LSL trait and primed LSL term. (A LSL trait is a specication of
mathematical vocabulary in an augmented form of rst-order logic with equality [15,
Chapter 4].) That notion is used to describe a notion of a \completely-dened" term.
An LSL term is completely-dened if it can be proved to have the same value in all
models of its trait. A completely-dened term is similar to a dened (non-?) term
in logics like LPF; this is the main technical distinction between the two notions of
protection. Finally we dene the notion of underspec-protection itself.
The notion of a primed trait and term is a variation of the idea of \priming" traits
and terms found in the Larch Prover (where it is used in proving that an operator is
\converted" [15, pp. 142{4]).
Denition 2.2 (Primed Trait, T
0
) Let T be an LSL trait. Let T
0
be a version
of the trait T with every operator f in T replaced by f
0
, except that the following
operators are left alone:
2
In these logics, there is also no way to separate underspecication that is used to make operators
\partial" from underspecication that is used to make specications intentionally less constraining,
as in a choose operator for sets.
6factTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
fact: Int ! Int
asserts
8 i: Int
fact(0) == 1;
(i > 0) ) (fact(i) = i * fact(i-1));
Figure 6: A trait for factorial, written in LSL.
 all operators in the built-in trait Boolean,
 all operators in all instances of the built-in traits Conditional (which species
if then else), and Equality (which species the operators = and 6=), and
 all operators mentioned in a generated by clause.
For example, consider the trait factTrait, given in Figure 6. The trait factTrait
0
has fact replaced by fact
0
, but true and the boolean operators are not primed, and
neither are 0, pred, and succ, because they are mentioned in the generated by
clause of the trait Integer [15, p. 161]. Operators mentioned in a generated by
clause are meant to give a way to produce all values of a given sort; priming these
would add \junk" to the specication. Another reason why not priming operators
mentioned in a generated by clause is reasonable is that if one imagines constructing
equivalence classes from terms, one starts with the terms formed from the generators,
and collapses equivalent ones; in this process, a generator applied to the same argu-
ments always ends up in the same equivalence class. This reects the model theory
of LSL, in which operators are all (deterministic) functions. Hence it is not necessary
for generators to be canonical; i.e., it is not necessary that the generation process be
free. Furthermore, it is okay if there is more than one set of generators asserted for a
type, as all must be functions.
Similarly, if P is a term in the language of T , then let P
0
be a copy of P with
every operator f that appears in P replaced by f
0
, with the same exceptions as for
primed traits. For example, if P is \result = fact(x)", then P
0
would be \result =
fact
0
(x)", because fact is not exempted from priming, \=" is exempt from priming,
and result and x are not operators. As another example, if P is \bufSize" from the
trait in Figure 5, then P
0
would be bufsize
0
, because bufSize is an operator.
In what follows, we write T ` P to mean that P is provable from trait T .
Denition 2.3 (completely-dened) An LSL term, P (~x), with free variables ~x of
sorts
~
U , is completely-dened for trait T if and only if
T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : P (~x) = P
0
(~x):
Trivial examples of completely-dened terms include variables, because for each
trait T , T [ T
0
` 8x : U : x = x. A more interesting example is that, for factTrait,
7uses factTrait(int for Int);
int factorial(int x);
behavior {
requires 0  x ^ x  8;
ensures result = fact(x);
}
Figure 7: A specication of the factorial procedure in Larch/C++.
the term fact(27) is completely-dened, but both fact(-1) and fact(x), where
x:Int, are not. As another example, consider the trait ChoiceSet [15, p. 176] where
the operator choose is specied as follows.
b 6= { } ) choose(b) 2 b
For this trait, the term choose(f1g [ f2g) is not completely-dened.
The following denition of when a procedure specication is protective says, in
essence, that the precondition must be completely-dened for the used trait, and that
whenever the precondition holds, then the postcondition must be completely-dened.
The two requirements in the denition are analogous to those for partiality protection,
with complete-denition tests playing the role of the denedness predicate.
Denition 2.4 (underspec-protective) A procedure specication, S, that uses trait
T , has formal parameters ~x :
~
U , precondition Q(~x), and postcondition R(~x), is
underspec-protective if and only if
 T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : Q(~x) = Q
0
(~x), and
 T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : Q(~x)) (R(~x) = R
0
(~x)).
The denition of underspec-protective suggests a direct proof technique. For
example, to prove that the specication of factorial in Figure 7 is underspec-
protective, one must show that factTrait [ factTrait
0
proves both of the following:
 8x : int : (0  x ^ x  8) = (0 
0
x ^ x 
0
8
0
), and
 8x : int : (0  x ^ x  8) ) (result = fact(x)) = (result = fact
0
(x)).
Proofs, such as the one sketched above, that a procedure specication is underspec-
protective are quite tedious to carry out in detail, at least by hand. While they may
be amenable to machine support, it is also convenient to dene a notion that is easier
for humans to deal with.
3 Proving Underspec-Protection
In this section we describe an easier way to prove underspec-protection in a Larch
family BISL. This proof technique uses extra information that speciers could add
8biggerTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
muchBigger, somewhatBigger: Int ! Int
asserts
8 i: Int
somewhatBigger(i) == muchBigger(i);
implies
converts somewhatBigger: Int ! Int
Figure 8: An LSL trait in which somewhatBigger is convertible, but
somewhatBigger(i) is not completely-dened.
to LSL traits. This extra information would also allow a user of LSL to specify more
precisely and check what is intended to be completely-dened.
Since we are only concerned with underspec-protection in this section and the
next, we will simply refer to it as \protection" in informal remarks.
3.1 Specifying What is Not Underspecied
LSL already has some provision for specifying what is not underspecied | the
specication of when an operator is \converted". This is done by using a converts
clause. A converts clause says that the axioms of the trait uniquely dene the
operators named in the clause, \relative to the other operators in the trait" [15, p.
142]. (We include in Appendix B a more detailed explanation of conversion for the
sake of completeness.)
However, proving that an LSL operator is converted does not mean it is completely-
dened; it may still be underspecied. For example, consider the trait in Figure 8. In
this trait, the operator somewhatBigger is dened to be equal to muchBigger; how-
ever, muchBigger is quite underspecied, since no assertions constrain it. Yet, the
converts clause in the implies section is still provable, because somewhatBigger is
completely-dened, relative to muchBigger. That is, once muchBigger is determined,
somewhatBigger becomes completely-dened.
Because of this distinction between conversion and complete denition, we propose
adding another implication clause to LSL. This clause, which we call the exact clause,
has a form similar to that of the LSL exempting clause (although it would not be
a subclause of a converts clause). The idea is that it would allow one to make
redundant claims that terms are completely-dened. For example the exact clause
in Figure 9 says that terms of the form fact(k) are intended to be completely-dened,
if k  0. The syntax would be as follows.
exact-clause ::= 'exact' [quantifier] [such-that] term+,
such-that ::= 'such' 'that' term
The extra information in the exact clause, which does not aect the trait's theory,
can be used to help debug an LSL specication, by trying to prove the following
property.
9factTraitE: trait
includes factTrait
implies
exact 8 k: Int such that k  0
fact(k)
Figure 9: A trait that demonstrates the exact clause. The includes directive has
the eect of textually including the trait factTrait given above.
Denition 3.1 (provable for exact clauses) Let T be a trait that contains an ex-
act clause of the form exact 8~a :
~
A such that Q(~a) P (~a), where Q(~a) is a predicate
and P (~a) is a term in the language of T . This clause is provable for T if and only if:
T [ T
0
` 8~a :
~
A : (Q(~a) ^Q
0
(~a))) P (~a) = P
0
(~a): (1)
For example, in Figure 9, the exact clause is provable for factTraitE if the
following condition is provable from factTraitE [ factTraitE
0
.
8k : Int : (k  0 ^ k 
0
0)) fact(k) = fact
0
(k):
The proof would proceed by induction on k.
3.2 Exact Predicates
For use in proving protection, we dene predicates of the form Exact(`E'), based on
the form (i.e., the text) of each expression E. These resemble the domain predicates,
Dom(`E'), described by some authors [12, 9, 5]. However, they have a dierent
purpose, since an operator, such as choose on nonempty sets, may be underspecied
for a reason other than being partial. They also resemble the denedness predicate
(D) used in studies of partial algebras [7] and in COLD [10]; however D is dened
model-theoretically, not syntactically. The denition of Exact(`') is based on the
exact clauses given in the trait's implications and those of included traits. This
denition is lifted to arbitrary terms by requiring terms substituted for the variables
in an exact clause to be themselves exact, and using the structure of terms formed
from LSL's built-in trait operators (boolean operators, equality, and conditionals).
See Figure 10 for the denition.
3
For example, for the trait of Figure 9, the following holds.
Exact(`fact(k)') = (k  0)
3.3 Using Exact Predicates to Prove Underspec-Protection
Provided the information given in the exact clauses is provable for a trait T , then
Exact predicates can be used as a sucient condition for determining when a term
is completely-dened for T .
3
The free variables of these terms are not important, so they are suppressed.
10
Exact(`x') = true, if x is a variable
Exact(`P (
~
E)') =
V
E
i
2
~
E
Exact(`E
i
') ^ Q(
~
E),
if the trait's implies section contains a clause:
exact 8~a :
~
A such that Q(~a) P (~a)
Exact(`:E') = Exact(`E')
Exact(`E
1
 E
2
') = Exact(`E
1
') ^ Exact(`E
2
'),
if  is =, 6=, or a boolean operator: ^, _, or )
Exact(`8~x :
~
T : E') = 8~x :
~
T : Exact(`E')
Exact(`9~x :
~
T : E') = 8~x :
~
T : Exact(`E')
Exact(`if E
1
then E
2
else E
3
') = Exact(`E
1
')
^ Exact(`E
2
') ^ Exact(`E
3
')
Exact(`E') = false, otherwise
Figure 10: Denition of Exact.
Lemma 3.2 Let T be a trait in which each exact clause is provable for T . Let R(~x)
be a term with free variables, ~x :
~
U . If T ` 8~x :
~
U : Exact(`R(~x)'), then R(~x) is
completely-dened for T .
Proof: (by induction on the structure of terms). Suppose T ` 8~x :
~
U:Exact(`R(~x)').
For the basis, suppose R(~x) is a variable x
i
. Then 8~x :
~
U : x
i
= x
i
is trivially
provable, and so x
i
is completely-dened by denition.
For the inductive step, suppose that the result holds for all subterms of R(~x). If
R(~x) is an invocation of some operator of T that is not a boolean operator, equality,
inequality, or if then else, then by denition, it must be that R(~x) has the form
P (
~
E(~x)) and that trait T has a clause of the form exact 8~a :
~
A such that Q(~a)
P (~a). Furthermore, by denition of Exact(`  '), it must be the case that
T `
^
E
i
(~x)2
~
E(~x)
Exact(`E
i
(~x)') ^Q(
~
E(~x)): (2)
Since T
0
is a primed copy of T , it must also be the case that
T
0
`
^
E
0
i
(~x)2
~
E
0
(~x)
Exact(`E
0
i
(~x)') ^Q
0
(
~
E
0
(~x)): (3)
Because the ~x are free in the above two formulas, by universal generalization
T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : Q(
~
E(~x)) ^Q
0
(
~
E
0
(~x)): (4)
By the inductive hypothesis, since each E
i
(~x) is exact, for each i,
T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : E
i
(~x) = E
0
i
(~x): (5)
Since the exact clauses are assumed to be provable for T , by denition we have
T [ T
0
` 8~a :
~
A : (Q(~a) ^Q
0
(~a))) P (~a) = P
0
(~a): (6)
11
Instantiating ~a to
~
E(~x), we obtain the following.
T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : (Q(
~
E(~x)) ^Q
0
(
~
E(~x))) P (
~
E(~x)) = P
0
(
~
E(~x)) (7)
Then using Formula (5), it follows that
T [ T
0
` 8~x :
~
U : (Q(
~
E(~x)) ^Q
0
(
~
E
0
(~x)))) P (
~
E(~x)) = P
0
(
~
E
0
(~x)): (8)
But by (4), the hypothesis of this implication is provable, so T[T
0
` 8~x :
~
U:P (
~
E(~x)) =
P
0
(
~
E
0
(~x)) follows.
The other cases follow directly from the inductive hypothesis and the denition
of Exact(`  ').
However, the converse to the above lemma does not hold. One reason is that the
specier of the used trait may not note when some terms are exact. But even if the
information given is complete, the denition of Exact does not take into account other
knowledge from the theory of the trait. For example, consider the trait bufferTrait,
which is specied in Figure 5. It species the constant bufSize, but bufSize is
underspecied (hence no exact clause is given). The term
bufSize < 4096
is completely-dened for bufferTrait. However,
Exact(`bufSize < 4096') = false,
because Exact(`bufSize') is false.
Denition 3.3 (exact procedure specication) A procedure specication, S, that
uses trait T , has formal parameters ~x :
~
U , precondition Q(~x), and postcondition R(~x),
is exact if and only if
 T ` 8~x :
~
U : Exact(`Q(~x)'), and
 T ` 8~x :
~
U : Q(~x)) Exact(`R(~x)').
Our suggested technique for proving protection, therefore, is to prove that the
specication in question is exact.
Corollary 3.4 Let T be a trait in which each exact clause is provable for T . Let
S be a procedure specication that uses trait T . If S is exact, then S is underspec-
protective.
Proof: Let Q(~x) be the precondition of S, and let R(~x) be its postcondition.
Suppose S is exact. Then by denition, T ` 8~x :
~
U : Exact(`Q(~x)'). So by
Lemma 3.2, Q(~x) is completely-dened for T . Also by denition, T ` 8~x :
~
U :Q(~x))
Exact(`R(~x)'). Suppose for each ~x, Q(~x) holds. Then, for each ~x, Exact(`R(~x)')
holds, and so by Lemma 3.2, R(~x) is completely-dened for T .
As an example of the use of the above corollary, we show how to prove that the
specication of factorial in Figure 7 is completely-dened with respect to the trait
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void chaos1(int& x);
behavior {
modies x;
ensures true;
}
Figure 11: The Larch/C++ specication of a procedure that is underspec-protective,
even exact, but not deterministic.
factTraitE of Figure 9. To do this we prove that the specication is exact with
respect to factTraitE. First, the precondition is exact, because Exact(`x  0') is
true. Exact(`0') is true, because 0 is a generator. We assume the trait Integer
has been extended with implications that say that  is exact.
Then for the postcondition, one can calculate as follows, for all x : int.
x  0 ) Exact(`result = fact(x)')
= {by definition of Exact}
x  0 ) (Exact(`result') ^ Exact(`fact(x)')
= {by definition of Exact for fact}
x  0 ) (Exact(`result') ^ Exact(`x') ^ x  0)
= {by definition of Exact for variables, treating result as a variable}
x  0 ) (true ^ true ^ x  0)
= {by predicate calculus}
true
However, if a procedure specication is protective, it is not necessarily exact. For
example, a specication that uses the term bufSize < 4096 as its precondition could
be protective without being exact. Thus exactness is a sucient, but not necessary,
condition for protection.
4 Discussion of Underspec-Protection
One might wonder whether a procedure specication is underspec-protective if and
only if it is deterministic. However, the two notions are orthogonal. For example, the
specication given in Figure 11 is protective (even exact) but very nondeterministic.
It species a C++ procedure that can change the value of the object x (passed by
reference) to any integer. Figure 12 is an example of a specication that is not
protective, because the precondition is not completely-dened, but the procedure
specied must be deterministic when its precondition is met.
The notion of underspec-protection should also not be confused with the specica-
tion being \well-dened" in the sense of not containing any mathematically suspect
terms. For example, the specication in Figure 13 is not protective, because the
operator choose is (intentionally) underspecied. However, the specication is well-
dened because the precondition does protect choose from being applied outside its
intended domain. (Note that the specication describes a set of functions that are
each deterministic, but which individually can use any algorithm to pick elements of
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uses bufferTrait;
int foo(int x);
behavior {
requires bufSize < x;
ensures result = 3;
}
Figure 12: A specication that is deterministic but not underspec-protective.
uses IntSetTrait;
int pick(IntSet s);
behavior {
requires size(s^) > 0;
ensures result = choose(s^) ^ s' = delete(choose(s^), s^);
}
Figure 13: A specication that is \well-dened" but not underspec-protective. The
notations s^ and s' mean the starting and ending values of s.
a set.) Thus a specication that is not protective is not necessarily ill-dened; there
is no problem as long as the underspecication at the interface level is intentional.
Our technical results related to underspec-protection are summarized in Table 1.
The main concept is determining when a procedure specication is protective, in the
sense that it does not force implementations to satisfy unintended consequences of
an LSL trait. We have given two proof techniques for proving protection. The rst is
equivalent to the denition and based on the notion of completely-dened terms. The
second is a sucient but not necessary test and based on the notion of exact terms,
which makes it easier to apply. The concept of an exact term is based on an extension
to LSL that allows one to specify which terms are not intended to be underspecied.
This extension to LSL provides better documentation and allows enhanced debugging
(in the sense of [11] [15, Chapter 7]) of LSL specications.
Level Facts
Trait exact ) completely-dened Lemma 3.2
completely-dened 6= convertible Figure 8
BISL exact ) underspec-protective Corollary 3.4
underspec-protective 6= deterministic Figures 11 and 12
well-dened 6) underspec-protective Figure 13
Table 1: Summary of results related to underspec-protection.
14
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have given two denitions that are instances of the concept of
protection. The denition of partiality-protection can be used with languages like
VDM-SL and COLD-K, since these languages use a logic that admits the existence
of partial functions. Underspec-protection is an analogous notion that is necessary
for languages like Larch, RESOLVE, and Z, since they use logics that deal only with
total functions.
Both kinds of protection may be useful in VDM-SL or COLD-K, where one can
dene partial functions and use underspecication. For example, after checking that
a VDM-SL specication is partiality-protective, then one could check that it was also
underspec-protective (assuming that the procedure was intended to be completely
specied and not underspecied). Checks that a VDM-SL procedure is underspec-
protective can be done in same way as we described them for the Larch family.
Both kinds of protection may also be useful for writers of executable specications.
For example, in a language like Eiel [23], partiality-protection for a procedure would
ensure that its precondition would be agged as false instead of encountering an error,
allowing an error to happen in its body, or encountering an error in its postcondition.
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A Appendix: Understanding Underspecication in
LSL
A partial function is a function that does not give a value for some elements of its
declared domain. For example, the operator that returns the head of a list can be
modeled as a partial function on lists; if that is done, then head(empty) fails to
denote an element. (That is, head(empty) is \undened.")
The logic used by the Larch Shared Language (LSL) [15, Chapter 4] [16] deals with
partiality by using underspecication. As noted in the main body, this means that one
avoids specifying a value for undened terms, but the logic assumes that all functions
are total. For example, head(empty) denotes some element of the appropriate type,
even if the user has not specied what element that term denotes. Where an LSL
specication is silent, terms take on some (unspecied) value.
In common with other logics that use underspecication to avoid the undened
[14], the logic of LSL is classical, and thus has several pleasing formal properties.
However, as Jones pointed out in a recent paper [18], there are a few subtle aspects
to this kind of logic that users should be aware of.
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JonesExample1: trait
includes Integer
introduces
it: ! OneElem
f: Int ! OneElem
asserts
OneElem generated by it
8 i: Int
f(i) == if i=0 then it else f(i-1)
implies
converts f: Int ! OneElem
Figure 14: Jones's rst example, a function into a one-element set.
factTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
fact: Int ! Int
asserts
8 i: Int
fact(i) == if i=0 then 1 else i * fact(i-1);
implies
equations
fact(3) == 6;
fact(-1) == - fact(-2);
Figure 15: Jones's factorial example.
We translate Jones's rst example into the LSL trait shown in Figure 14. This trait
denes a sort, OneElem, a constant it, and a function f. Because of the generated by
clause, the sort OneElem has only one element, the constant it. (The current version
of LSL allows such sorts, contrary to [18].) In LSL f(-1) = it, because f has to
take on some value when applied to -1, and the only possible value is it. Although
Jones notes that this is \not an inconsistency" he says that \it is certainly likely to
surprise someone who views" the denition of f as specifying \a partial function" (p.
66). Another way of putting Jones's point is that it is simply impossible to specify
partial functions in LSL, even using recursion.
Jones's other major example brings out a more important warning about the
underspecication approach. This example is a recursive denition of the factorial
function, and is translated into LSL in Figure 15. Jones's warning about this example
is that, in a logic such as LSL's, a model of fact must satisfy irrelevant equations
such as the following, which is also highlighted in the redundant implies section of
the trait.
fact( 1) ==  fact( 2) (9)
This follows because fact(-1) denotes some (unspecied) value.
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badRecTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
zero: Int ! Int
asserts
8 k: Int
zero(k) == if k = 0 then 0 else min(k, zero(k-1));
implies
8 k : Int
zero(-1) < -1;
zero(-1) < k;
Figure 16: A trait with an inconsistent recursive denition.
Jones's warning could have been stated more strongly, since not only is there
a danger that one might specify unwanted properties, but there is also a danger
that these unwanted properties might cause inconsistency. The trait factTrait of
Figure 15, actually has quite a few such unwanted equations but manages to escape
inconsistency because of special properties of the integers. (That is, the following
equations are also consequences of the trait.
fact(-1) == (-1) * fact(-2)
fact(-2) == (-2) * fact(-3)
fact(-3) == (-3) * fact(-4)
However, the trait is not inconsistent, because one can let fact(i) == 0 for all neg-
ative integers i, which allows all these equations to be satised.)
To illustrate what can happen if one is not careful, consider the trait badRecTrait
of Figure 16. At rst glance, it looks like zero is a (silly) denition of a constant
function that returns zero for any nonnegative integer. However, this specication
is not careful to explicitly underspecify the value of zero for negative arguments.
That is, although the specier might think that it does not matter what zero returns
for negative arguments, just ignoring the issue in the specication does not mean
that the value is underspecied. For example, what does the specication say about
zero(-1)? It is easy to see that it is less than -1, and less than -2, and indeed
less than any integer. But the Integer trait in Guttag and Horning's handbook (see
[Guttag-Horning93], p. 163) does not allow there to be such an integer; so this trait
is inconsistent, because the value of zero(-1) is overspecied | it has to satisfy too
many constraints. Although none of these constraints were intended, the trait is just
as inconsistent as if they were intentionally specied.
To avoid the possibility of such inconsistency arising from unintentional over-
specication, it is best to use intentional underspecication. That is, to avoid the
possibility that an operator may be inconsistently specied (and the need to prove
that the inconsistency does not happen), it is best to use conditional equations in-
stead of unguarded recursive equations. For example, one can write factTrait as
in Figure 6, where the equation for the recursive case is only postulated to hold for
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its intended domain [14]. By writing factTrait in that way, one avoids postulating
Equation (9); that is, nothing at all is specied about the value of fact(-1).
B Appendix: Conversion and an Extension to LSL
This appendix explains the notion of conversion in LSL, and also presents an extension
to LSL that makes the specication of conversion more expressive.
B.1 Conversion
In an LSL trait, one can state redundant properties (theorems) that one believes do
(or should) hold. These redundant properties are stated in the implies section of the
specication. Proofs of such properties can be attempted, and are a way of debugging
the trait [11] [15, Chapter 7].
For our purposes, the most interesting kind of redundant property one can state in
the implies section is that an operator is well-dened with respect to other operators.
This is done by using a converts clause, as was done in Figure 14. A converts clause
says that the axioms of the trait uniquely dene the operators named in the clause,
\relative to the other operators in the trait" [15, p. 142]. To prove this, one must
show it for all possible arguments. The Larch Prover (LP) uses the following proof
technique [15, pp. 142{4]. Let T (
~
f) be a trait, which names operators
~
f in converts
clauses in its implies section. Let T (
~
f
0
) be a version of the trait T (
~
f) in which each
of the operators f
i
named in a converts clause is replaced by f
0
i
. Then one proves,
for each such f
i
:
~
A! B,
T (
~
f) [ T (
~
f
0
) ` 8~a :
~
A : f
i
(~a) = f
0
i
(~a): (10)
The proof would show that there cannot be two dierent interpretations of the oper-
ator f
i
.
For example, to prove the converts clause for f in Figure 14, one axiomatizes an
operator f' in the same way as f, and then proves the following.
8 i: Int f(i) == f'(i)
(This is proved by using the rule given by the generated by clause in Figure 14.)
Often one wants to prove that an operator is converted, except for some arguments.
For example, one would want to prove that the head operator on lists is converted,
except that head(empty), which is purposely left underspecied. To do this one uses
a converts clause of the following form in LSL.
converts
head: List[T] ! T
exempting head(empty)
The exempting clause allows the specier to state what terms are intentionally
underspecied. In terms of the proof that head is converted, except where it is not
intentionally underspecied, the exempting clause allows one to use the following
equation
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factTrait: trait
includes Integer
introduces
fact: Int ! Int
asserts
8 i: Int
(i > 0) )
(fact(i) = (if i=0 then 1 else i * fact(i-1)));
implies
8 i: Int
fact(3) == 6;
converts
fact: Int ! Int
exempting 8 k: Int such that k < 0
fact(k)
Figure 17: A trait demonstrating the extended exempting clause.
head(empty) == head'(empty)
in the proof that, for all lists l, head(l) == head'(l).
B.2 An extension to LSL
The exempting clause in the current LSL [15, Chapter 4] [16] does not have enough
expressive power to state, in general, what is left underspecied. One can only exempt
a class of terms that are described by constants or universally quantied variables.
For example, one cannot specify that fact in Figure 6 is intentionally underspecied
by adding an exempting clause, because the current LSL only allows one to specify
that constants, or all integers, are exempted. That is, there is no way to say that
only the negative integers are exempted.
We propose extending LSL by allowing domain predicates for the variable decla-
rations in an exempting clause. For example, we would allow the exempting clause
of the trait given in Figure 17. This form of the exempting clause allows one to
specify the intended exemptions with an arbitrary (boolean-valued) LSL term.
4
The
syntax would be as follows.
exemption ::= 'exempting' [quantifier] [such-that] term+,
such-that ::= 'such' 'that' term
The extension to the LP proof technique for proving the converts clause in Fig-
ure 17 is simple. The exempting clause gives one the following formula
8 k: Int
(k < 0) ) (fact(k) = fact'(k))
4
There is logical problem if the predicate following such that uses an operator being specied
as converted in the same converts clause. The simplest thing to do is not to allow the use of such
operators in the domain predicate (following such that).
19
which one can use in the proof that, for all integers i, fact(i) == fact'(i). Given
that fact' is axiomatized with a copy of the axioms for fact, this allows one to prove
that fact is converted where it is not intentionally underspecied.
This extension to LSL increases its expressive power by its ability to state redun-
dant and checkable information.
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